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Abstract
Risk-sharing in insurance is analyzed, with a view towards explain-
ing the prevalence of deductibles.
First we introduce, in a modern setting, the main concepts of the
theory of risk-sharing in a group of agents. This theory we apply to the
risk-sharing problem between an insurer and an insurance customer.
We motivate the development through simple examples, illustrating
some of the subtle points of this theory.
In order to deduce deductibles endogenously, not explained in the
neoclassical model, we separately introduce (i) the insurable asset as
a decision variable, (ii) administrative costs, and (iii) moral hazard,
and illustrate by examples.
KEYWORDS: Reinsurance Exchange, Equilibrium, Pareto Opti-
mality, Representative Agent, Core Solution, Individual Rationality,
Deductibles, Costs, Moral Hazard.
Introduction
Deductibles in some form or another is often part of real world insurance
contracts, but most of the classical theory of risk-sharing is unable to explain
this phenomenon. In this paper we discuss deductibles from the perspective
of economic risk theory, and try to point out when optimal contracts contain
deductibles.
The model we consider is a special case of the following: Consider a group
of I agents, that could be consumers, investors, reinsurers (syndicated mem-
bers), insurance buyers etc., having preferences over a suitable set of random
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prospects. These preferences are assumed to be represented by expected util-
ity, meaning that there is a set of utility functions ui : R→ R, such that X
is preferred to Y if and only if Eui(X) ≥ Eui(Y ). Here the random variables
X and Y may represent terminal wealth, or consumption in the final period.
They could also represent insurance risks by a proper reformulation. We
assume smooth utility functions with the properties that more is preferred
to less, i.e., these functions are strictly increasing, and agents are risk averse,
i.e., these functions are all convex.
Each agent is endowed with a random payoff Xi called his initial port-
folio. Uncertainty is objective and external, and there is no informational
asymmetry. All parties agree upon the space (Ω,F , P ) as the probabilis-
tic description of the stochastic environment, the latter being unaffected by
their actions. Here Ω is the set of states of the world, F is the set of events,
formally a sigma-field generated by the given initial portfolios Xi, and P is
the common belief probability measure. It will be convenient to posit that
both expected values and variances exist for all the initial portfolios, since
this it true in real life applications of the theory.
We suppose the agents can negotiate any affordable contracts among
themselves, resulting in a new set of random variables Yi, representing the
possible final payout to the different members of the group, or final portfolios.
The transactions are carried out right away at “market prices”, where pi(Y )
represents the market price for any non-negative random variable Y , and
signifies the group’s common valuation of Y relative to the other random
variables having finite variance. The essential objective is then to determine:
(a) The market price pi(Y ) of any “risk” Y from the set of preferences of
the agents and the joint probability distribution of the Xi’s.
(b) For each individual, to determine the final portfolio Yi most preferred
by him among those satisfying his budget constraint.
Finally, market clearing requires that the sum of the Yi’s equals the sum
of the Xi’s, denoted XM .
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 1 we define key concepts
like Pareto optimality, risk tolerance (aversion), and give Borch’s characteri-
zation of Pareto optimality. In our subsequent treatment we more or less take
for granted the concepts of a competitive equilibrium, Borch’s Theorem, as
well as the representative agent construction that leads to the solution of (a)
and (b) above. With this as a starting point, in Section 2 the above general
formulation is applied to the problem of finding the optimal risk exchange
between an insurer and a policy holder. In this section we also present a sim-
ple, motivating example. Deductibles in the optimal contracts are treated
in Section 3. First we discuss deductibles stemming from no frictions, then
from administrative costs and finally deductibles arizing from moral hazard.
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Section 4 concludes.
A glaring omission in our treatment of deductibles is that of adverse
selection. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) showed in their seminal paper that
the presence of high risk customers caused the low risk customers to accept
a deductible. Since the analysis of this problem deviates quite substantially
from the treatment in the rest of the paper, we have omitted it. Adverse
selection is, however, another prominent example of asymmetric information
that causes deductibles and less than full insurance to be optimal.
Risk tolerance and aggregation
First we define what is meant by a Pareto optimum. The concept of Pareto
optimality offers a minimal and uncontroversial test that any social optimal
economic outcome should pass. In words, an economic outcome is Pareto
optimal if it is impossible to make some individuals better off without making
some other individuals worse off.
Karl Borch’s characterization of a Pareto optimum Y = (Y1, Y2, · · · , YI)
simply says that there exist positive ”agent” weithts λi such that the marginal
utilities at Y of all the agents are equal modulo these constants, i.e.,
λ1u
′
1(Y1) = λ2u
′
1(Y2). · · · = λIu′1(YI) = u′λ(XM), a.s.
The function u′λ(·) is interpreted as the marginal utility function of the rep-
resentative agent. The risk tolerance function of an agent ρ(x) : R→ R+, is
defined by the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion function R(x) = −u′′(x)
u′(x) ,
where the function u is the utility function in the expected utility framework.
Consider the following nonlinear differential equation:
Y ′i (x) =
Rλ(x)
Ri(Yi(x))
, (1)
where Rλ(x) = −u
′′
λ(x)
u′λ(x)
is the absolute risk aversion function of the represen-
tative agent, and Ri(Yi(x)) = −u
′′
i (Yi(x))
u′i(Yi(x))
is the absolute risk aversion of agent
i at the Pareto optimal allocation function Yi(x), i ∈ I. There is a neat
result connecting the risk tolerances of all the agents in the market to the
risk tolerance of the representative agent in a Pareto optimum. It goes as
follows:
(a) The risk tolerance of ”the market”, or the representative agent, ρλ(XM)
equals the sum of the risk tolerances of the individual agents in a Pareto op-
timum, or
ρλ(XM) =
∑
i∈I
ρi(Yi(XM)) a.s. (2)
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(b) The real, Pareto optimal allocation functions Yi(x) : R→ R, i ∈ I satisfy
the nonlinear differential equations (1).
The result in (a) first appeared in Wilson (1968), and can also be found
by Borch (1985). It is in fact a direct consequence of Borch’s Theorem; see
also Bu¨hlmann (1980) for the special case of exponential utility functions.
The result has several important consequences, among which we mention
one: Suppose there is a risk neutral agent. In a Pareto optimum all the risk
will be carried by this agent.
The risk exchange between an insurer and a
policy holder
Some of the issues that may arise in finding optimal insurance contracts are,
perhaps, best illustrated by an example:
Example 1: A potential insurance buyer can pay a premium αp and thus
receive insurance compensation I(x) := αx if the loss is equal to x. He then
obtains the expected utility
U(α) = E{u(w −X − αp+ I(X))},
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a constant of proportionality. It is easy to show that if
p > EX, it will not be optimal to buy full insurance, i.e., α∗ < 1 (see e.g.,
Mossin (1968)).
On the other hand, the following approach was suggested by Karl Borch
(e.g., Borch (1990)). The situation is the same as in the above, but the
premium functional is p = (αEX + c) instead, where c is a non-negative
constant. It follows that here α∗ = 1, i.e., full insurance is indeed optimal:
Eu(w −X + I(X)− EI(X)− c) ≤ u(w − EX − c),
which follows by Jensen’s inequality, in fact for any compensation function
I(·). Equality above is obtained when I(x) = x, i.e., full insurance is optimal
(if c is small enough such that insurance is preferred to no insurance.) In
other words, we have just demonstrated that the optimal value of α equals
one. 
The seeming inconsistency between the solutions to these two problems
has caused some confusion in the insurance literature. In the two situations
of Example 1 we only considered the insured’s problem. Let us instead take
the full step and include both the insurer and the insurance customer, in
which case “optimality” mean Pareto optimality.
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Consider a policy holder having initial capital w1, a positive real number,
and facing a risk X, a non-negative random variable. The insured has utility
function u1, where monotonicity and strict risk aversion prevails, u
′
1 > 0, u
′′
1 <
0. The insurer has utility function u2, u
′
2 > 0, u
′′
2 ≤ 0, so that risk neutrality is
allowed, and initial reserves w2, also a positive real number. These parties can
negotiate an insurance contract, stating that the indemnity I(x) is to be paid
by the insurer to the insured if claims amount to x ≥ 0. It seems reasonable
to require that 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x for any x ≥ 0. Notice that this implies that no
payments should be made if there are no claims, i.e., I(0) = 0. The premium
p for this contract is payable when the contract is initialized.
We recognize that we may employ our established theory for generating
Pareto optimal contracts. Doing this, Moffet (1979) was the first to show the
following:
The Pareto optimal, real indemnity function I: R+ → R+, satisfies the
following nonlinear, differential equation
∂I(x)
∂x
=
R1(w1 − p− x+ I(x))
R1(w1 − p− x+ I(x)) +R2(w2 + p− I(x)) , (3)
where the functions R1 = −u
′′
1
u′1
, and R2 = −u
′′
2
u′2
are the absolute risk aversion
functions of the insured and the insurer, respectively.
In our setting this result is an immediate consequence of the result (b) of
the previous section, provided the premium p is taken as a given constant.
From this result we see the following: If u′′2 < 0, it follows that 0 <
I ′(x) < 1 for all x, and, together with the boundary condition I(0) = 0, by
the mean value theorem that
0 < I(x) < x, for all x > 0,
stating that full insurance is not Pareto optimal when both parties are strictly
risk averse. Notice that the natural restriction 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x is not binding at
the optimum for any x > 0, once the initial condition I(0) = 0 is employed.
Also observe that contracts with a deductible d can not be Pareto optimal
when both parties are strictly risk averse, since such a contract means that
Id(x) = x − d for x ≥ d, and Id(x) = 0 for x ≤ d for d > 0 a positive real
number. Thus either I ′d = 1 or I
′
d = 0, contradicting 0 < I
′(x) < 1 for all x.
However, when u′′2 = 0 we notice that I(x) = x for all x ≥ 0: When the
insurer is risk neutral, full insurance is optimal and the risk neutral part, the
insurer, takes all the risk. Clearly, when R2 is uniformly much smaller than
R1, this will approximately be true even if R2 > 0.
This gives a neat resolution of the ”puzzle” in Example 1. We see that
the premium p does not really enter the discussion in any crucial manner
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when it comes to the actual form of the risk sharing rule I(x), although this
function naturally depends on the parameter p.
Deductibles
No frictions
The usual explanation of deductibles in insurance goes via the introduction of
some frictions of the neoclassical model. There are a few notable exceptions,
of which we mention one: The common model of insurance takes the insurable
asset as given, and then finds the optimal amount of insurance given some
behavioral assumptions. In order to explain the wealth effect in insurance,
Aase (2007) uses a model where the amount in the insurable asset is also a
decision variable. In this situation solutions can arise where the insurance
customer would like to short the insurance contract, i.e., I∗(x) < 0 for some
losses x > 0, for the optimal solution I∗. Since this violates I∗ ∈ [0, x],
a deductible naturally arises, since no insurance then becomes optimal at
strictly positive losses.
In fact this seems to be the most common reason why deductibles arise
also under frictions; when some constraint becomes binding at the optimum,
usually caused by a friction, a deductible may typically arise.
The first case we discuss in some detail is that of administrative costs.
Administrative costs
The most common explanation of deductibles in insurance is, perhaps, pro-
vided by introducing costs in the model. Intuitively, when there are costs
incurred from settling claim payments, costs that depend on the compensa-
tion and are to be shared between the two parties, the claim size ought to be
beyond a certain minimum in order for it to be Pareto optimal to compensate
such a claim.
First we mention that Arrow (1970) has a result where deductibles seem
to be a consequence of risk-neutrality of the insurer.
Following Raviv (1979), let the costs c(I(x)) associated with the contract
I and claim size x satisfy c(0) = a ≥ 0, c′(I) ≥ 0 and c′′(I) ≥ 0 for all I ≥ 0;
in other words, the costs are assumed increasing and convex in the indemnity
payment I, and are ex post.
Raviv then shows that if the cost of insurance depends on the coverage,
then a nontrivial deductible is obtained. Thus Arrow’s (1970, Theorem 1)
deductible result was not a consequence of the risk-neutrality assumption
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(see also Arrow (1974)). Rather it was obtained because of the assumption
that insurance cost is proportional to coverage. His theorem is then a direct
consequence of above cited result. A consequence of this is the following:
If c(I) = kI for some positive constant k, and the insurer is risk neutral,
the Pareto optimal policy is given by
I(x) =
{
0, if x ≤ d;
x− d, if x > d.
where d > 0 if and only if k > 0.
Here we obtain full insurance above the deductible. If the insurer is
strictly risk averse, a nontrivial deductible would still result if c′(I) > 0 for
some I, but now there would also be coinsurance (further risk sharing) for
losses above the deductible.
Risk aversion, however, is not the only explanation for coinsurance. Even
if the insurer is risk neutral, coinsurance might be observed, provided the
cost function is a strictly convex function of the coverage I. The intuitive
reason for this result is that cost function nonlinearity substitutes for utility
function nonlinearity.
A, perhaps, more natural cost function than the one considered above,
would be a zero cost if no claim, and a jump at zero, to a > 0 say, if a small
claim is incurred. Thus the overall cost function is aχ[I>0] + c(I), where
c(0) = 0, χB being the indicator function of B. Then, so long as I < a it is
not optimal for the insured to get a compensation, since the cost, through
the premium, outweighs the benefits, and a deductible will naturally occur,
even if c′ ≡ 0.
To conclude this section, a strictly positive deductible occurred if the
insurance cost depended on the insurance payment, and also if a cost at zero
is initiated by a strictly positive claim. Coinsurance above the deductible
d ≥ 0 results from either insurer risk aversion or cost function nonlinearity.
For further results on costs and optimal insurance, see e.g., Spaeter and
Roger (1995).
Moral Hazard
A situation involving moral hazard is characterized by a decision taken by
one of the parties involved (the insured), that only he can observe. The other
party (the insurer) understands what decision the insured will take, but can
not force the insured to take any particular decision by a contract design,
since he can not monitor the insured.
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The concept of moral hazard has its origin in marine insurance. The
old standard marine insurance policy of Lloyd’s - known as S.G. (ship and
goods) policy - covered “physical hazard”, more picturesquely described as
“the perils of the sea”. The “moral hazard” was supposed to be excluded, but
it seemed difficult to give a precise definition of this concept. Several early
writers on marine insurance (e.g., Dover (1957), Dinsdale (1949), Winter
(1952)) indicate that situations of moral hazard were met with underwriters
imposing an extra premium.
The following idea was initiated by Holmstro¨m (1979). In order to explain
this, let, as in the above, u2(x) and w2 denote the insurer’s utility function
and initial wealth, u1(x), w1 are similarly the corresponding utility function
and initial wealth of the insured. In the latter case the function v(a) denotes
disutility of level of care (or effort for short) a, effort designated to minimize
or avoid the loss. Only the insured can observe a. The loss facing the insured
is denoted by X, having probability density function f(x, a). Observe that
we are here thinking of part of the level of care that is unobservable by the
insurer. Many insurance contracts are contingent upon certain actions taken
by the insured, actions that can be verified or observed by the insurer. This
is not what we have in mind at the present, we only consider non-observable
level of care.
Notice that here we deviate from the neoclassical assumption that uncer-
tainty is exogenous, since the stochastic environment is now effected by the
insured’s actions.
The problem may be formulated as follows:
max
I(x),a,p
Eu2(w2 − I(X) + p)
where I(x) ∈ [0, x], p ≥ 0, subject to
Eu1(w1 −X + I(X)− p)− v(a) ≥ h¯,
and
a ∈ argmaxa′{Eu1(w1 −X + I(X)− p)− v(a′)}.
The first constraint is called the participation constraint (individual rational-
ity), and the last one is called the incentive compatibility constraint. This
latter is the moral hazard constraint, and says that the customer will use
the effort level a that suits him best, and this is also feasible, since the
insurer does not observe a. Technically speaking, the natural requirement
0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x will be binding at the optimum, and this causes a strictly
positive deductible to occur. We illustrate by an example:
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Example 2: Consider the case with u2(x) = x, u1(x) =
√
x, v(a) = a2
and the probability density of claims f(x, a) = ae−ax is exponential with
parameter a (effort). Notice that P (X > x) = e−ax decreases as effort a
increases: An increase in effort decreases the likelihood of a loss X larger
than any given level x.
We consider a numerical example where the initial certain wealth of the
insurer w1 = 100, and his alternative expected utility h¯ = 19.60. This
number equals his expected utility without any insurance. In this case the
optimal effort level is a∗ = 0.3719.
In the case of no moral hazard, we solve the problem without the incentive
compatibility constraint, and obtain what is called the first best solution. As
expected, since the insurer is risk neutral, full insurance is optimal: I(x) = x,
and the first best level of effort aFB = .3701, smaller than without insurance,
which is quite intuitive.
The expected utility of the representative agent we may denote the welfare
function. Here it is:
Eu2(w2 + p− I(X)) + λ(Eu1(w1 − p−X + I(X))− v(a))
= w2 + 195.83,
since λ = λFB = 9.8631. Here pFB = 2.72. Moving to the situation with
moral hazard, full insurance is no longer optimal. We get a contract with a
deductible d, and less than full insurance above the deductible:
I(x) =

0, if 0 ≤ x ≤ d;
x+ p− w1 + (λ+ µa − µx)2, if d < x ≤ λµ + 1a ;
x+ p− w1, if x > λµ + 1a .
Here the deductible d = 11.24, the second best level of effort a = aSB = .3681.
Notice that this is lower that aFB. The Lagrangian multipliers of the two
constraints are: λSB = 9.7214 and µ = 0.0353. The second best premium in
this case is pSB = 0.0147.
Due to the presence of moral hazard there is now a welfare loss: The
expected utility of the representative agent has decreased:
Eu2(w2 + p− I(X)) + λSB(Eu1(w1 − p−X + I(X))− v(aSB))
= w2 + 187.73,
implying a welfare loss of 8.10 compared to the first best solution. Notice
that the premium pSB is here lower than for the full insurance case of the first
9
best solution, due to a smaller liability, by the endogenous contract design,
for the insurer in the situation with moral hazard. 
In the above example we have used the first order approach, justified in
Jewitt (1988).
Again we see that deductibles may result, and also coinsurance above
the deductible, when the classical model predicts full insurance and no de-
ductible.
A slightly different point of view is the following: If the insured can gain
by breaking the insurance contract, moral hazard is present. In such cases the
insurance company will often check that the terms of the insurance contract
are being followed. Note, in the above model the insurance company could
not observe the action a of the insured. This was precisely the cause of the
problem in Example 2. Here, checking is possible, but will cost money, so
it follows that the mere existence of moral hazard will lead to costs. This is
a different type of costs from those of Example 2, but has the same origin -
moral hazard. The present situation clearly invites analysis as a two-person
game played between the insurance company and its customer.
Borch (1980) takes up this challenge, and finds a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies. In this model the insured pays the full cost of moral hazard
through the premium.
It seems to have been Karl Borch’s position that moral hazard ought to
be met by imposing an extra premium.
From the above example we note that increased premiums may not really
be the point in dealing with this problem: Here we see that the second best
premium pSB is actually smaller than the first best pFB. The important
issue is that the contract creates incentives for the insured to protect his
belongings, since he carries some of the risk himself under the second best
risk sharing rule. This is brought out very clearly in the above example if
the first best solution is implemented when moral hazard is present. Then
the insured will set his level of effort a = 0, i.e., to its smallest possible level,
since he has no incentive to avoid the loss, resulting in a very large loss with
high probability (a singular situation with a Dirac distribution at infinity).
Since the second best solution is the best when moral hazard is present,
naturally this leads to a low welfare, in particular for the insurer.
Conclusions
Optimal risk sharing was considered from the perspective of Pareto optimal-
ity. Relying on the concepts of a competitive equilibrium, Pareto optimality,
Borch’s Theorem, and the representative agent construction, we discussed
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some key results regarding risk tolerance and aggregation, which we applied
to the problem of optimal risk-sharing between an insurer and a customer.
The development was motivated by a simple example, illustrating some of
the finer points of this theory. It turned out that the concept of a Pareto
optimal risk exchange is exactly the right notion of optimality in the present
situation.
In order to explain deductibles, which do not readily follow from the
neoclassical theory, we separately introduced (i) the insurable asset as a
decision variable, (ii) administrative costs, and (iii) moral hazard, the latter
also illustrated by an example.
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